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Procyclical absenteeism might be due to higher sick-rates of marginal workers, or a 
consequence of procyclical sick-report incentives. These hypotheses predict opposite 
signs for the correlation between sick-rates and shares of temporary contracts. This is 
the case, when the share of temporary contracts is a proxy for the share of marginal 
workers, and an indicator of stronger incentives for job presence of temporary 
employees who have generally weaker job security than those on permanent 
contracts. Using industry-region panel data, we find a stable negative correlation 
between sick-rates and shares of temporary contracts implying that procyclical sick-
rate is compatible with the idea that sick-report incentives are procyclical. 
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Several studies report a negative correlation between aggregate sick-
ness absence and the unemployment level.1 There are two main
theoretical explanations for a negative relationship between unem-
ployment and sickness absence. First, unemployment might aect
sickness absence behavior. If absenteeism increase the risk of job
loss, a higher unemployment rate will then reduce the propensity to
report sick. A second mechanism is related to the sickness propen-
sity of the marginal workers entering or leaving the working pop-
ulation in various states of the business cycle. When employers
can choose whom to lay-o, the most absence-prone workers are
more likely to be laid o in an economic downturn (Leigh (1985)).
This implies that in downturns, the employees' absence rate falls.
Analogously, the absence rate increases in times of falling unem-
ployment when the marginal individual leaving unemployment to
employment has an above average sick-absence rate.
Based on Swedish establishment data aggregated for 14 indus-
tries in 3 regions, we observe a positive relation between employ-
ment and sick absence implying that workers in expanding indus-
tries and regions have higher sick-rates. This is in line with pre-
vious studies where unemployment and sick-rates are found to be
negatively correlated. Given such a relation one needs to discrimi-
nate between the hypothesis that this correlation is due to changes
in worker (sick-report) behavior or a result of higher sick-rates of
marginal workers and thus a worker-composition eect. Though
several studies analyze the role of economic incentives for worker
sick absenteeism no previous study deals with empirical testing of
1See e.g. Leigh (1985) and Kaivanto (1997). For Swedish studies see Lantto
(1992) and B ackman (1998).
1the mechanisms behind procyclical sick absenteeism.2
The purpose of this paper is to discriminate between the hy-
potheses outlined above by investigating the relation between the
share of temporary contracts and the sick-rate. The labor protec-
tion law in Sweden makes it easier to reduce employment by not
renewing temporary contracts rather than facing the costs of r-
ing workers with permanent contracts. New employment contracts
are often on a temporary basis. Furthermore, we observe that the
share of temporary contracts in expanding establishments is twice
this share in contracting establishments. Share of temporary em-
ployment in an industry-region cell is thus a good indicator of the
share of marginal workers. The selection eect (changes in worker-
composition) hypothesis would thus imply a positive correlation
between sick-rates and the share of temporary contracts.
The worker incentive eect hypothesis would on the contrary
imply a negative correlation between these variables since workers
on temporary contracts experience weaker job-security and thus
would tend to have less sick absence. This is the case when a
low sick-rate improves the chances of a renewed contract. These
two hypotheses predict opposite signs of the estimated coecient
for temporary contracts. This enables us to discriminate between
these two rival hypotheses.
Our results imply that the sick-rate and the share of temporary
contracts are negatively and signicantly correlated. This correla-
tion is basically unchanged when we take into account the share
of females, young workers, employment as well as industry-region
eects. We also control for time-specic eects meant to capture
2For the role of economic incentives and sick absenteeism see e.g. Barmby et
al. (1991, 1994, 1995), Johansson and Palme (1996), Winkelman (1999), Brown
et al.(1999)
2all general business-cycle eects and changes in the social insurance
system. Our results do not support the selection eect hypothesis,
they indicate instead that worker-behavior is in
uenced by the type
of employment contract implying that less job-security is associated
with lower sick-rate. Finally, our sensitivity analysis regarding en-
dogeneity of temporary contracts as well as persistence in sick-rates
leaves our results basically unchanged.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 deals with
data description and the empirical set-up. Our estimation results
are reported in Section 3. In section 4 we deal with the dynam-
ics of sick-rates and endogeneity of temporary contracts applying
dynamic panel data methods. The paper is concluded in Section 5.
2 Data and empirical set up
The data are from the Short Term Employment Statistics3 collected
by Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyr an, SCB). We use quar-
terly information on employment stocks and absenteeism for a panel
of around 10,000 establishments in the non-agricultural private sec-
tor, during the period 1989:1-1999:4. All measures of employment
are reported separately for men and women and separately for tem-
porary and permanent employment contracts. Information regard-
ing sickness absence refers to the number of employees absent from
work due to sickness a given day.
The sample is drawn from the population of private sector estab-
lishments of all sizes in Sweden and stratied according to industry
aliation and establishment size. Establishments with 100 employ-
ees or more are sampled with probability one. In order to include
3Kortperiodisk syssels attningsstatistik.
3newly started establishments and avoid attrition due to establish-
ments exit, 10 percent of the sample is updated every year for the
period 1989-1994. After the rst quarter of 1995 the sample is
updated every six months. The samples are randomly divided into
three groups. Each group reports the requested information for only
one month in a quarter. For example one third of establishments
report employment in a certain day in January while the establish-
ments in the other two groups report employment in a certain day
in February and March respectively.
This sampling strategy implies that the establishment level ob-
servations refer to dierent points in time for dierent establish-
ments and are not perfectly comparable. On the aggregate-level,
however, the information refers to the whole quarter since it is based
on three measurements in every quarter. Moreover, the panel struc-
ture of the data on the establishment level is not satisfactory when
considering longer periods. Small establishments enter and leave
the data frequently while large establishments are present for most
of the time.
To avoid measurement problems and obtain results referring to
the total population we aggregated the establishment level data
to a panel data set containing 42 industry-region cells (14 indus-
tries times 3 regions). An observation is thus an industry-region
cell which we follow quarterly during the period 1989-1999 in a
balanced panel yielding 1,848 observations in total. The regional
aggregation is done with three regions including: big cities, forest
counties and all other counties. The industry classication refers
to an aggregation that allows comparison of the Swedish industry
classication standard from 1969 to that of 1992.4
4The aggregated data can be obtained from the authors on request. The
underlying establishment level data can be obtained from Statistics Sweden, or
4Table 1. Sample statistics, panel of 14 industries in 3 regions, 1989:1 - 1999:4.
Number of observations: 1,848.
Mean SD Min Max
Sick-rate 4 2 0.5 17
Employment (Thousands) 47 59 0.5 355
Female Share of Employment 37 16 9 68
Share of Temporary contracts 10 7 0.6 48
Share of workers younger than 35 38 11 13 71
Share of workers younger than 25 13 8 0.0 44
Share of workers older than 51 25 7 9 55
Share of workers older than 56 14 4 4 30
Sample statistics are reported in Table 1. The dependent vari-
able in our analysis is the sick-rate dened as the share of industry-
region cell employees who are reported sick. The absenteeism mea-
sure here does not include any temporary or permanent disability
pensions nanced within the general sick insurance system.
Our explanatory variables are aggregate employment, the share
of young workers, females and employees with temporary contracts
in each industry-region cell. The data on the share of young work-
ers is computed for 1989 -1998 from the individual data set LINDA
(Longitudinal Income Data, Statistics Sweden).5 These data are
then matched on industry-region level. The female workers' share
of employment is intended to control for variation in sick-rates be-
tween women and men and the share of young is meant to capture
variation in sick-rates related to age.
We estimate a standard error-component model on our panel of
industry-region cells using our variables as described above. Our
from the authors for replication.
5The latest wave of LINDA is from 1998 and therefore we set the age shares
for 1999 equal to those of 1998.
5basic specication is: yit = x
0
it+uit; uit = i+t+"it; where yit is
the sick-rate for industry-region cell i in the time t, xit is a vector
of our basic explanatory variables: employment, share of female
employees, share of temporary contracts and share of young workers
aged 35 years or younger. The error term is decomposed into an
industry-region eect, a time eect and a normally distributed error
term with a zero mean.
Measuring the number of sick reported individuals in a certain
day capture long term absenteeism with a higher probability com-
pared to short term absenteeism. This should not be a major prob-
lem since sick-absence for employees with part or full-time tempo-
rary disability pensions are not included in our measure. However,
given that employees on temporary contracts are less likely to be on
long term sick-absence, long term absenteeism is lower in industries
with higher shares of temporary contracts. These types of sys-
tematic time-invariant industry-region dierences are captured by
our industry-region xed eects.6 Moreover, we estimate a model
including the number of permanent jobs as well as an interaction
between the share of temporary contracts and the number of per-
manent jobs. This estimation allows us to control for dierential
variation over time in the share of temporary contracts that stems
from variation in permanent jobs and its impacts on long term sick-
ness captured by our measure of the sick-rate.
Finally, two problems might lead to inconsistent estimates. First,
the share of temporary contracts might be endogenous. This is the
case when increased sick-rate leads to increased temporary employ-
6Notice that the standard variables determining individual absenteeism such
as marital status as well as the number and age of children might dier across
industries. This is captured by our xed eects specication. Our objective is
not to explain level dierences in absenteeism across individuals or industries,
but rather the pattern of changes over time.
6ment meant to replace absent employees. Such a positive corre-
lation would make it dicult for us to observe a negative eect of
temporary contracts on sick-rates. Second, the dynamic of the sick-
rate might be characterized by persistence over time. This is the
case when workers' sick report behavior adjusts slowly to changes
in incentives and/or changes in the share of marginal workers.
We deal with the endogeneity of the share of temporary con-
tracts and the persistence of sick-rate by applying the techniques
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) as well as Blundell et al.
(1998, 2000). This yields GMM-estimates where share of tempo-
rary contracts are instrumented to account for endogeneity and the
lagged sick-rate is included as explanatory variable to incorporate
possible persistence of sick-rate.
3 Results
Results reported in Table 2 indicate that sick-rate is positively cor-
related to employment in line with previous results indicating a neg-
ative correlation between unemployment and sick-rate. Our main
concern here is the impact of temporary employment on sick-rates
which turns out to be negative and highly signicant.
These results seem to be robust controlling for a number of po-
tential determinants of sick-rate. The within estimates presented
in Table 2 represent the impact of explanatory variables after con-
trolling for industry-region xed eects such as industry specic
working conditions and the local labor market situation.
Workers on temporary contracts have limitations on duration
of sick period due to the duration of their contract. Therefore we
expect that the share of long-term sick absenteeism is negatively
correlated to share of temporary contracts. As mentioned above,
7our measure of sick-rate captures long-term sickness with a higher
probability compared to short-term sick periods. To deal with this
problem we controlled for the number of permanent contracts and
the interaction between this variable and the share of temporary
contracts. These two variables capture variations in sick-rate that
stems from variations in the number of permanent contracts as well
as variations in the share of temporary contracts that is induced by
variations in permanent contracts. Adding these controls leaves
our estimate of the share of temporary contracts qualitatively un-
aected indicating that the estimate for the share of temporary
contracts represents own-eects (Model 4 in Table 2).
We also explicitly take into account the impact of female rate
of employment and share of young workers. The coecient for the
share of female workers turns out to be positive and signicant as
expected. The coecient for young workers is highly insignicant
in Model 2, Table 2, re
ecting the fact that within industry-region
variation in the share young workers over time is mainly due to
the general demographic trend of aging population captured by
our time eects. This is conrmed by the results of estimating a
model not including time eects where the coecient for the share
of young is positive and highly signicant.
We also experimented with two other measures of age. Running
Model 2 with the share of workers older than 50 or 55 yield in-
signicant estimates for these variables. Notice that the share of
temporary contracts and older workers are negatively correlated in
cross-section. However, our within estimates use the time variation
of the variables. The insignicant estimates for the age variables
simply re
ect the poor over-time variation in age variables other
than those associated with the trend of an aging working popula-
tion.
8We consider time xed eects by allowing time specic intercepts
corresponding to each industry-region cell. A possible time eect is
the eect of changes in work-pace producing procyclical sick-rates.
Time xed eects capture all global cyclical eects as well as all
symmetric eects of changes in the social insurance system.
Table 2. Sick-rates and temporary employment. employment weighted within
estimates.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
% Temp. contr. -0.111** -0.061** -0.147** -0.083**
(0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Employment*10 3 0.002* 0.005** - -
(0.001) (0.001)
% Fem. Employment 0.226** 0.049** - -
(0.015) (0.011)
% Age < 35 0.305** -0.011 - -
(0.011) (0.010)
Perm. contr. * 10 3 - - - 0.019**
(0.0014)
Perm. contr.* - - - -0.104**
% Temp. contr. * 10 5 (0.011)
Time xed eects - YES YES YES
NxT 1848 1848 1848 1848
R2 within 0.51 0.79 0.58 0.59
Notes: All models include quarterly dummies to control for seasonal vari-
ation. Hausman tests indicate that for all model specications, the individual
eect is correlated with the regressors implying that the xed-eects specica-
tion should be used. Signicance at the 5 and 1 per cent level are denoted by *
and **.
It is interesting to note that the time xed eects are powerful in
explaining the variation in sick-rate. The within R2 rises from 0.51
9to 0.79. This is not surprising since the health insurance system in
Sweden is guided by the principle of having general insurance with
very little dierentiation, a principle that also aects all changes
in the system. In this way, the eects of institutional changes on
sick-rate is to a large extent symmetric for individuals in various
industries. Moreover, the time eects also capture the business
cycle eects which seems to have symmetric eects on sick-rates.
These controls do not alter the coecient for temporary con-
tracts in any signicant way. The estimated coecient is negative
and strongly signicant through all variations of our specication.
This result rejects the idea that the positive correlation between em-
ployment and sick-rate is due to a composition eect when share
of temporary contracts works as a proxy for marginal workers en-
tering or leaving employment. Incidence of temporary contract is
associated with lower sick-rate, implying that workers' absenteeism
behavior might be in
uenced by whether they are on temporary or
permanent contracts.
4 Dynamics of sick-rate and endogeneity of tem-
porary contracts
This section is devoted to a sensitivity analysis examining the ro-
bustness of our results reported in the previous section. The sick-
report behavior of workers might be persistent over time implying
that we should include a lag dependent variable in our specica-
tion and estimate a dynamic model. We use a GMM estimator to
estimate our dynamic model instrumenting the lagged dependent
variable. This estimator is denoted as GMM   IVy. Furthermore
we account for endogeneity of the share of temporary contracts by
instrumenting this variable with its lagged values. Instrumenting
10both the lagged dependent variable and the share of temporary
contracts yields our GMM   IVy;x estimates.7
For simplicity, in this section we use annual data. This is moti-
vated by the fact that obtaining GMM estimates with large number
of time periods is very demanding, due to the instrumenting pro-
cedure involved. This should not have any major impacts on our
results, since our within estimates based on annual and quarterly
data are qualitatively the same. However, to examine the role of
possible biases in our within estimates we compare the GMM esti-
mates with within and OLS estimates on annual data.
We re-examine the own-eect of temporary contracts, i.e. the
estimate of the temporary contracts when including the number
of permanent contracts and the interaction between the share of
temporary contracts and the number of permanent contracts as
done in Model 4 in Table 2. Using our various GMM-estimators,
we nd a similar pattern as in the case of the within estimator
presented in Table 2.
The estimated coecient for the lagged dependent variable in-
dicate substantial persistency in the rate of sick absenteeism. Test
statistics for AR (1) and AR (2) indicate that the residuals are
not random walk and imply absence of serial correlation. Accord-
ing to the Sargan test we can not reject that the instruments are
uncorrelated with the errors implying validity of our instruments.
The estimated coecients for employment seem to be rather
unstable. This is natural due to the high correlation of lagged
and present sick-rates, implying that the correlation between em-
ployment and present sick-rate is partly captured by the lagged
sick-rate. For our purpose, the main point is that the eect of tem-
7See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998, 2000)
11porary contracts is always negative and signicant across various
model specications.
Table 3. Sick-rates and Temporary Employment using annual data. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
OLS Within GMM
IVy IVy IVy;x IVy;x
DIF SYS DIF SYS
Sick-rate (-1) 0.810** 0.554** 0.725** 0.706** 0.704** 0.691**
(0.018) (0.039) (0.087) (0.124) (0.087) (0.082)
% Temp. -0.025** -0.056** -0.101** -0.055* -0.090* -0.127**
(0.008) (0.019) (0.038) (0.025) (0.036) (0.045)
Empl. *10 3 -0.001 0.000 0.002 -0.002* 0.003 -0.004*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (-0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
% Fem. Empl. 0.002 0.017 0.049** 0.007 0.047* 0.012*
(0.002) (0.015) (0.022) (0.004) (0.024) (0.005)
% Age < 35 0.014** 0.034** -0.000 0.021* -0.002 0.052**
(0.005) (0.013) (0.020) (0.011) (0.021) 0.018
NxT 378 378 378 420 378 420
AR(1) - - -2.77** -2.64** -2.77** -2.90**
AR(2) - - -0.50 -0.29 -0.48 -0.43
Sargan Test - - 33 31 33 30
NOTES: Signicance at the 5 and 1 per cent level are denoted by * and
**. All models include yearly dummies. The GMM   IVy estimator uses in-
struments for the lagged dependent variable. The GMM   IVy;x estimator uses
instruments for the lagged dependent variable as well as instruments for the share
of temporary contracts. DIF denotes the GMM-estimator using the Arellano &
Bond (1991) procedure where rst-dierences are instrumented using levels. SYS
refers to the GMM-estimator using the Blundell & Bond (1998, 2000) procedure
where rst-dierences and levels are used as instruments. GMM-estimates are
obtained using DPD for Ox (see Doornik (1999)).
12The various estimations presented in Table 3 always yield a nega-
tive and signicant coecient for the share of temporary contracts.
The size of the coecients range between -0.12 and -0.05. This is
however a result of dierent estimators properties as well as the
instrumenting procedure involved. For our purpose, the essential
matter is that the coecient is always negative and highly signi-
cant regardless of which estimator we use. Results reported in Table
3 unambiguously conrm the pattern that the share of temporary
contracts and sick-rate is negatively correlated.
5 Final remarks
We tested the hypothesis whether the observed procyclical pattern
of sick-rates is due to changes in workers sick-rate incentives as
the conditions in the labor market change or if this simply re
ects
changes in worker-composition when marginal workers with higher
sick absenteeism enter or leave the working population.
The share of temporary contracts being a proxy of marginal
workers would then be positively correlated to sick-rates according
to the latter hypothesis. On the other hand, employees on tempo-
rary contracts have stronger incentives for presence at job when this
aects their future employment chances. The share of temporary
workers should then be negatively correlated with sick-rate, when
workers sick-report incentives aect the aggregate sick-rate.
Our results indicate a negative relation between the share of
temporary contracts and the sick-rate in industry-region cells dur-
ing the nineties in Sweden. Both the selection and incentive mecha-
nism might be present behind the pattern of sick-rate over time, but
our results are in line with the idea that incentive-eects dominate.
The evidence seem to support the explanation that procyclical sick-
13rate is due to changes in worker sick-rates report incentives. The
correlation between the share of temporary contracts and sick-rates
is robust when controlling for industry-region eects, global time
eects, share of females, age structure as well as variation in perma-
nent jobs and changes in the share of temporary contracts resulted
from variations in permanent jobs.
We also estimated a dynamic model taking into account possible
persistence in the sick-rate and instrumented the share of tempo-
rary contracts by its lagged values to account for the possibility
of endogeneity bias. All results conrm a negative correlation be-
tween sick-rate and the share of temporary contracts indicating that
workers on temporary contracts have weaker sick-report incentives.
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